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Abstract
Most environmental policies that aim to encourage households to invest in more climate-
friendly technologies and retrofits, e.g., solar panels, electric cars, or attic insulation,
are broadly targeted and do not take households’ individual investment behaviour into
account. Scholars have, therefore, emphasised the need to account for household het-
erogeneity in policy design in order to ensure effective and efficient policy outcomes.
However, such a policy design requires the existence of easily accessible household char-
acteristics, which can reliably and consistently explain households’ investment behaviour
in a variety of investment scenarios. Using the vast empirical literature on the determi-
nants of households’ investments in energy-efficient home improvements as a case study,
we conduct a meta-analysis to: (i) determine the magnitude of the effects of easily acces-
sible household characteristics, and; (ii) test the stability of these effects under a variety
of circumstances. We integrate the empirical results from 63 publications that investigate
the impact of socio-economic characteristics on households’ energy-efficiency investments
and examine potential model- and sample-specific factors to explain the variation in the
estimated effects. Our findings for the household characteristics: income, age, educa-
tion, household size, and home ownership, show that significant effects only exist for
some of these characteristics, with income and home ownership showing the greatest
impact. Furthermore, the results confirm a strong situational component in the effect
of these household characteristics on households’ investment decisions, which challenges
1
the practicality of a tailored policy design.
JEL classification: Q40, D12, D04
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1. Introduction
Policy interventions to encourage households to invest in climate-friendly and energy-
efficient technologies and home-improvements are usually broadly targeted. Thus, they
provide similar incentives for the majority of households. However, households are not
identical but are instead heterogeneous in many respects. Therefore, they face different
barriers to investment (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012), such as imperfect information,
liquidity constraints, or split incentives, which discourage them from investing in new
technology or engaging in retrofitting that would be privately and socially profitable
(e.g., Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Gillingham et al., 2009).
To properly address potential investment barriers, scholars have, therefore, empha-
sised the need to design targeted policies that account for household heterogeneity (e.g.,
Stern, 1992; Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham and Palmer, 2013; Allcott et al.,
2014). The intuition is straightforward: if only a subset of households fails to adopt
profitable investment options and, therefore, stands to gain from a policy intervention,
specifically targeting these households will be more effective and eventually more cost-
effective than targeting all households.
However, despite the emphasised need to design targeted policies, it remains unclear
whether systematic and exploitable patterns in households’ investment behaviour exist.
Although observable investment decisions show considerable heterogeneity (e.g., Newell
and Siikamäki, 2013, 2015), households’ individual investment barriers are difficult and
costly to detect. Thus, in order to realistically consider household heterogeneity in policy
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design, the existence of observable variables that are easily accessible for policy makers or
policy modellers and that can consistently and reliably explain households’ heterogeneous
investment decisions is a basic prerequisite.
To investigate the existence of such variables, we conduct a meta-analysis based on
the large number of empirical studies that analyse the effect of socio-economic charac-
teristics on households’ investments in climate-friendly and energy-efficient technologies
and retrofitting (e.g., Ameli and Brandt, 2015; Aravena et al., 2016; Mills and Schleich,
2010a, 2012; Smiley, 1979; Trotta, 2018a).1 By integrating the results from 63 individual
studies with a total of 167 different regression results, we investigate the existence of
systematic and stable patterns across the following five standard characteristics: income,
age, education, household size, and home-ownership status as determinants of house-
holds’ investment behaviour. Furthermore, we compare the empirical effects of the five
variables with five hypotheses that are derived from a simple micro-economic investment
model in order to assess the alignment of the empirical results with economic theory.
We use these results to determine whether standard household characteristics can signif-
icantly and consistently explain the heterogeneity in households’ investment behaviour,
so that policy makers and policy modellers can use these characteristics as proxies to
incorporate household heterogeneity in policy design. Our analysis is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first to approach this question systematically.
The article is structured as follows: section 2 describes the theoretical investment
model and formulates the hypotheses; section 3 introduces our analysis, discusses the
search for relevant literature, and presents the empirical findings; section 4 discusses
these findings with respect to potential limitations and compares them to our theoretical
hypotheses; finally, section 5 concludes. Due to methodological constraints or limitations
on data availability, we had to dismiss studies that empirically analyse the effect of
socio-economic characteristics on households’ energy-efficiency investments. A detailed
overview of these studies is provided in table A.12 in AppendixA.1.
1We subsequently gather all investments in climate-friendly and energy-efficient technological and
retrofitting home improvements under the term ‘investments in energy-efficiency’.
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2. Model and Hypotheses Formulation
To set a theoretical framework for the analysis of the empirical results, we define a
simple investment model such as suggested by Allcott and Greenstone (2017). Households
can improve the climate impact of their home by investing in portable or non-portable
assets, e.g., energy-efficient appliances, building envelope renovations, or solar panels.
Let θij = (eij , ξij , cij , Tij)
′ be a vector, where i = 1, . . . , I is the household index,
and j ∈ Ji indicates a specific climate friendly investment from the set of all feasible
investment measures, Ji, available to household i. eij is the expected monetary present
day value (PDV) of eventual energy savings of the investment; ξij is the expected PDV
of the monetised non-monetary benefits of the investment (e.g., better indoor climate,
warm glow, etc.); cij are the monetary costs of the investment and Tij are the expected
monetised non-monetary costs (e.g., due to disruptive and time-consuming construction
work). We set up the following expected utility function:
E(U(yi, ei0,Bi0,Θi, Ii)) = yi − ei0 + Bi0 +
∑
j∈Ji
Iij(eij + ξij − cij − Tij), (1)
where yi is household income, a proxy for wealth
2; ei0 is the PDV of the expenditures of
the future baseline energy consumption without investments; Bi0 are the monetised non-
monetary benefits of the status quo; Θi = {θij ; j ∈ Ji} is the set of costs and benefits of
all energy-efficient measures available to household i; Iij is a dummy variable indicating
whether household i adopts investment option j, and Ii = {Iij ; j ∈ Ji}.
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These variables, except for yi and Iij , are usually unobserved latent variables. There-
fore, we suggest expressing them through functions that depend on the following five
observable household characteristics: income, yi, age, ai, education, di, household size,
2We expect overall wealth to be more relevant than income. However, because data on wealth is
rarely included in empirical studies, we do not include it in our model.
3We assume that all potential investments in set Ji are independent. Consequently, some energy-
efficient measures are package solutions, when their conservation effect depends on the combination of
several investments, e.g., a household with two potential investments A and B has three options: ’A‘,
’B‘, or ’A and B‘.
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zi, and the household’s ownership status, oi, which indicates whether a household owns
or rents its home. The expected utility function extends to:
E(U(yi, ei0,Bi0,Θi, Ii)) = yi − ei0(yi, ai, di, zi, oi) + Bi0(yi, ai, di, zi, oi) (2)
+
∑
j∈Ji
Iij(eij(yi, ai, di, zi, oi) + ξij(yi, ai, di, zi, oi)
− cij(yi, ai, di, zi, oi)− Tij(yi, ai, di, zi, oi))
Drawing on this function, equation (3) shows the effect of adopting investment j on the
expected utility of household i:
λij(·) = eij(yi, ai, di, zi, oi) + ξij(yi, ai, di, zi, oi) (3)
− cij(yi, ai, di, zi, oi)− Tij(yi, ai, di, zi, oi),
where λij = E(U(·) | Iij = 1) − E(U(·) | Iij = 0), which in our simple investment model
corresponds to the net present value (NPV) of investment j. The NPV depends on
the monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits, which we assume are functions of
heterogeneous household characteristics. Thus, income, age, education, household size
and ownership status determine whether λij is positive, negative, or neutral and, there-
fore, whether it affects households’ propensity to invest. In the following, we formulate
hypotheses considering how each of the five household characteristics affects λij and
the propensity to invest. The hypotheses serve as benchmarks in the evaluation of our
empirical results in section 4.
2.1. Income
Hypothesis 1 The higher the income, the higher the propensity for the household to
invest. This effect increases with the capital intensity of the investment.
Irrespective of the income level, most households stand to benefit from improving the
energy-efficiency of their home, either through monetary savings, eij , or non-monetary
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benefits, ξij . Thus, the main effect of income is determined on the cost side. Although
pure purchasing costs are likely to be the same for all households, capital costs may
vary considerably between income groups. High income households have better access
to capital and might face lower interest rates than low income households because the
former own more assets, which can be used as collateral. Thus, monetary costs cij are
expected to be lower for high income households than for low income households. This
effect is reinforced the larger the investment sum associated with an energy-efficiency
measure. On the other hand, households with a higher income face higher opportunity
costs connected to the time spent implementing the measure, which might increase the
non-monetary costs Tij for these households. This will particularly affect time-intensive
investments.
2.2. Age
Hypothesis 2 The effect of age on a household’s propensity to invest is ambiguous for
capital-intensive investments with long amortisation periods.
On the one hand, increasing age reduces the value of investment benefits because elder
household heads have a shorter time horizon to accumulate the benefits. Thus, the PDV
of monetary, eij , and non-monetary benefits, ξij , decreases with age, which lowers the
propensity to invest for elder household heads.4 A longer expected amortisation period
of an investment reinforces this effect.
On the other hand, increasing age reduces both monetary and non-monetary costs.
Considering monetary costs, cij , increasing age decreases credit constraints (Jappelli,
1990; Lyons, 2003) and the capital costs of elder households, as elder households will,
on average, own more assets than younger household heads.5 Again, larger investment
sums reinforce this effect. Considering the non-monetary costs, Tij , we expect that the
share of labour income to total income decreases for most households with increasing
4For simplicity, we assume a common discount rate across all households.
5This assumption is only valid until a certain age, after which capital costs eventually increase sharply
because lenders evaluate the risk of giving loans to elderly households as high.
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age (Aaronson et al., 2014). Elder household heads will, on average, have ceteris paribus
(e.g., for a given total income) a lower marginal income from labour and, consequently,
they have lower opportunity costs of leisure time. Thus, the higher the household head’s
age, the lower the costs linked to lost leisure time as a consequence of time-intensive
investments.
2.3. Education
Hypothesis 3 The higher the educational attainment, the higher a household’s propen-
sity to invest. This effect increases with the expected amortisation period of the invest-
ment.
Empirical analyses find a significant and negative effect of higher educational attain-
ment on the discount rate that an investing individual applies to future benefits (Harrison
et al., 2002). In other words, individuals with a longer education are, on average, more
patient and, hence, more willing to wait for future benefits. Thus, we expect that the
higher the educational attainment, the higher the assigned present day value of future
monetary, eij , and non-monetary benefits, ξij , and consequently, the higher the house-
hold’s propensity to invest. This effect is reinforced the longer the amortisation period
of the investment.
2.4. Household size
Hypothesis 4 The effect of household size on the propensity to invest is ambiguous for
capital-intensive investments, but positive for less capital-intensive investments.
Household size is primarily a control variable and, therefore, it impacts the propensity
to invest through other variables. On the one hand, a larger household size correlates,
ceteris paribus, with greater demand for energy services. If these energy services are pro-
vided more efficiently after an investment, larger households benefit over-proportionally
through larger energy savings. This effect increases the propensity of the household to
invest. On the other hand, a larger household size means, ceteris paribus, a lower per
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capita income, which eventually translates into higher costs of financing capital-intensive
investments and, thus, a lower propensity to invest. Thus, for capital-intensive invest-
ments, this lower propensity to invest may cancel out the higher propensity due to the
larger benefits, and overall results in an ambiguous net-effect of the variable.
2.5. Home ownership
Hypothesis 5 Home ownership increases a household’s propensity to invest. This effect
reinforces with the capital intensity of the investment.
Renting is commonly considered a barrier to investments within the home due to the
challenge of allocating costs and benefits between property owners and tenants (Jaffe
and Stavins, 1994). The barrier is strongest for capital-intensive investments. Whilst
households that own and live in their home would gain all monetary, eij , and non-
monetary benefits, ξij , of an investment, tenants do not benefit from, e.g., the increase
in real-estate value resulting from a home improvement. Thus, they are unable to reap the
full benefits of the investment. We, therefore, expect the propensity to invest to be lower
for households that rent compared to those that own. This argumentation becomes less
strong when considering minor investments in, e.g., energy-efficient appliances or light
bulbs. The costs and benefits of minor investments are most likely the same for owners
and renters.
3. Analysis
3.1. Literature Search
To identify relevant publications, we screened the literature for empirical studies that
analyse the determinants of households’ energy efficiency investment decisions both under
market conditions and as a reaction to policies in either an authentic or in an experimen-
tal (hypothetical) setting. We focused our search on the following three broad categories:
real market behaviour, stated preference studies—mainly choice experiments—, and pol-
icy evaluations, and used the following keywords: ‘energy efficiency’, ‘energy efficiency
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investment’, ‘energy efficiency households’, and ‘determinants energy efficiency invest-
ments’ in the literature databases: Google Scholar, Scopus, EconStor, and EconPapers.
We included all studies that investigated investment decisions regarding minor invest-
ments, e.g., light bulbs, thermostats, or smaller insulation or weatherisation projects,
medium investments, e.g., water heaters or appliances, and major investments, e.g.,
building insulation, solar panels, heating systems, or windows and doors. For each iden-
tified and relevant study, we also conducted a forward and backward citation search
in all four databases to identify further relevant publications that had not come up in
our initial search. In order to generate a comprehensive sample, we included both peer
reviewed and grey literature in our search (Stanley, 2001). The search was conducted
during 2017 and 2018.
We screened all studies that contained relevant empirical analyses for household char-
acteristics that are both frequently used and easily accessible to modellers and policy
makers. The studies included a multitude of different household characteristics as co-
variates, of which the most frequently used were: income, age, education, household size,
and home ownership. Other frequently included characteristics were race and number
of children living in the household, whilst variables such as household debt, employment
status, and gender were used infrequently. Environmental attitudes and political affili-
ation are often included covariates—especially in the political science and psychological
literature. However, as these household characteristics are normally not easily accessible
to policy modellers and policy makers as they require extensive surveying, we did not
include them in our meta-analysis. Given these results, we focused on the following five
household characteristics: income, age of household head, education of household head,
household size, and home ownership.
From the potentially relevant literature, we selected publications that fulfilled the
following criteria:
• present empirical results of the determinants of private households’ investment
choices in energy efficiency,
9
• contain at least one of the five selected household characteristics as a covariate,
i.e., the publications included in our analysis present empirical results that allow infer-
ence about the propensity of households to invest in measures that would improve the
households’ energy efficiency.
We found a total of 104 relevant publications that matched the two criteria (a more de-
tailed overview of all 104 publications can be found in the online appendix of this article).
However, we had to discard 41 publications because of insurmountable methodological
differences or an absence of vital statistical information, which meant that extracting
comparable effect measures was impossible.
The empirical analyses reported in the identified publications differ significantly in
terms of their methodological approaches, which in some cases prevents a direct com-
parison of the regression coefficients.6 The main empirical approaches used in the 104
publications include: pairwise correlations between energy efficiency investments and
household characteristics (three publications), the regression of factor loadings, derived
from multiple energy efficiency investments, on household characteristics (three publica-
tions), the regression of investment sums or tax rebates on household characteristics (12
publications), and the impact of household characteristics on a household’s likelihood to
invest in energy efficiency (83 publications). Only the latter approach provided a suf-
ficient number of comparable observations that could be included in our meta-analysis
(79 publications in total). All other empirical approaches failed to provide the critical
number of comparable observations to support reliable results in a meta-analysis.
Where standard errors, p-values, or t-values were missing in the publication, i.e., the
significance of the coefficient estimate was only indicated by asterisks, we calculated the
standard errors of the coefficient estimates at the thresholds as defined by the published
asterisks (e.g., by assuming a p-value of 0.05 for two asterisks or if indicated otherwise
in the study by the corresponding p-value) and assumed a default p-value of 0.5 for sta-
6E.g., the magnitude of regression coefficients from studies where the endogenous variable is con-
tinuous is incomparable to the magnitude of regression coefficients from studies where the endogenous
variable is binary or categorical.
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tistically insignificant coefficient estimates. Using this approach will in almost all cases
create standard errors for the coefficient estimates that are upwards biased, hence, they
will reflect the additional insecurity connected to the respective observation in the sub-
sequent meta-analysis. In order to test whether our default choice of 0.5 for insignificant
coefficient estimates had any impact on our results, we ran a sensitivity analysis setting
the default p-value to {0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}, respectively. The impact was negligible (at
the fourth decimal) and, hence, we proceeded with a default p-value of 0.5 for statistically
insignificant coefficient estimates.
Where vital summary statistics were missing in the publication, we first contacted
the authors of the study. If summary statistics were not provided by the authors, we
tried to find approximate estimates for the missing variable means through secondary
statistics, assuming that the study used a representative sample from the population of
interest. However, despite our efforts, we had to discard another 16 studies from the
meta-analysis due to missing summary statistics, so that our final sample comprises 63
publications with a total of 167 regression results.
If a publication included several estimations, we refrained from calculating the mean
effect of the variable of interest across all included estimations, and instead included
all the estimation results that were either based on different samples or sub-samples, or
addressed different choice categories, e.g., insulating the roof and purchasing solar panels.
Following Houtven et al. (2017) we later accounted for the panel structure of our data
by using cluster robust standard errors.
Table 1 gives an overview of all publications that have been included in our meta-
analysis. Furthermore, in order to preserve the relevant results from all excluded studies,
we generated Table A.12 (see appendix), which only compares the direction of the ef-
fects of the variables of interest on households’ propensity to invest in energy efficiency.
Although a mere effect-counting study cannot provide the same in-depth analysis as a
meta-analysis, we argue that the results, nevertheless, may be important additional in-
dicators for the quantification of the overall effect of the five household characteristics
11
on the propensity to invest.
Table 1: Publications included in the meta-analysis
Publications
Abeliotis et al. (2011) Alberini et al. (2014) Allen et al. (2015)
Ameli and Brandt (2015) Andor et al. (2016) Aravena et al. (2016)
Baldini et al. (2018) Blasch et al. (2017a) Blasch et al. (2017b)
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) Braun (2011) Brechling and Smith (1994)
Burlinson (2017) Brounen et al. (2013) Cirman et al. (2013)
Collins and Curtis (2017) Das et al. (2018) Datta and Filippini (2016)
Dato (2018) Dieu-Hang et al. (2017) Di Maria et al. (2010)
Durham et al. (1988) Bruderer Enzler et al. (2014) Fujii and Mak (1984)
Frondel and Vance (2013) Gamtessa (2013) Gans (2012)
Gillingham et al. (2012) Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2018) Hamilton et al. (2016)
Hasset and Metcalf (1995) McCoy and Lyons (2017) Jakob (2007)
Johnson-Carroll et al. (1987) Kesternich (2010) Ledesma-Rodriguez (2014)
Leicester and Stoye (2013) Martínez-Espiñeira et al. (2014) Meier and Tode (2015)
Michelsen and Madlener (2012) Mills and Schleich (2009) Mills and Schleich (2010a)
Mills and Schleich (2010b) Mills and Schleich (2012) Murray and Mills (2011)
Nauleau (2014) Newell and Siikamäki (2015) Neveu and Sherlock (2016)
Noonan et al. (2015) Palmer et al. (2015) Pon and Alberini (2012)
Qiu et al. (2014) Ramos et al. (2016) Sahari (2017)
Sardianou (2007) Scasny and Urban (2009) Schleich et al. (2017)
Schwarz et al. (2014) Trotta (2018b) Trotta (2018a)
Tsvetanov and Segerson (2014) Walsh (1989) Welsch and Kühling (2009)
3.2. Extraction of effect measures and moderator variables
Our meta-analysis focusses on adoption studies where the dependent variable is ei-
ther binary or (ordered) categorical. However, even within this group of publications,
a multitude of different estimation methods have been applied. Our sample comprises
studies that use linear probability models, binary logistic regression models, binary pro-
bit regression models, ordered probit regression models, multivariate probit regression
models, multinomial logistic regression models, or OLS in combination with a dependent
variable that varies between 0 and 1 (e.g., shares). Overall, the majority of the analyses
are based on micro data at the household level, whilst some analyses are based on locally
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aggregated data (e.g., at the ZIP code level). These methodological differences prevent
a direct comparison of the coefficient estimates from different analyses. Furthermore,
differences in the measurement units of continuous covariates (e.g., income measured in
$1000 or $10,000) and different encodings of categorical or interval-coded covariates (e.g.,
three income categories versus six income categories) aggravate this problem.
To overcome the problem of comparability, we use the R (R Core Team, 2018) package
urbin (Henningsen and Henningsen, 2018a,b) to calculate semi-elasticities for continuous
covariates, ǫk =
∂P (Y = 1|X = x)
∂xk
· xk, and effects for each category of categorical or
interval-coded covariates, Ek = P (Y = 1|X = x, xk = 1) − P (Y = 1|X = x, xk = 0), at
the sample means of the respective study samples. In cases where categorical or interval-
coded covariates are grouped in different ways or where the base category differs, we used
package urbin to unify the number of categories, interval-bounds, and base categories
across all studies. Furthermore, we used urbin to calculate the semi-elasticities from
categorical or interval-coded covariates and effects from continuous covariates in order
to unify the effect measures across all studies. Finally, we used urbin to redress results
from ordered probit regression models and multinomial logistic regression models into
results from regression models with a binary response variable. To derive approximate
standard errors for the calculated semi-elastisticities and effects that could be used as
weighting factors in the meta-analysis, we followed the approach described in Henningsen
and Henningsen (2018b) and implemented in urbin.7
Next to the effect measures, we also extract a number of moderator variables from
the publications (see table 2 for details). Because our effect measures are, in most
cases, only a sub-set of the covariates that explain a household’s likelihood of investing
in energy efficiency, the variance in our effect measures may be the result of either
the characteristics of the respective sample and/or the model specification that was
chosen by the analyst. To take these different influences into account, we extract two
7The online-appendix to this publication provides a detailed description of the modifications and
calculations performed on the coefficient estimates, sample means, and standard errors of each included
publication.
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Table 2: Variable names and definitions
Name Definition
Effect measures:
elaIncome Semi-elasticity of continuous income variable
effAgeMid/Old Effect of interval coded variable age, where the base category
is 18–35 years, the medium category is 36–50 years, and the
senior category is 51–80 years.
effEdu Effect of categorical variable education, where the base cate-
gory is ‘below university/college’ and the second category is
‘some university/college or higher’.
elaHZ Semi-elasticity of variable household size.
effOwn Effect of binary variable home-ownership, where the base cat-
egory is ‘no ownership’.
Moderator variables:
year Year of publication.
sampleZ Number of observations in study.
nCov Number of covariates in study.
share Share of adopters in sample.
country Country where study was conducted, with 0 = multiple OECD
countries, 1 = Canada, 2 = USA, 3 = Ireland, 4 = UK, 5 =
Germany, 6 = Southern Europe, 7 = Central Europe, 8 =
Northern Europe.
experiment Categorical variable of whether the study has been conducted
as an experiment (field and hypothetical), with the base cat-
egory ‘no experiment’.
investment Categorical variable describing the size of the investment,
with the base category ‘minor investment’, comprising smaller
investments such as light bulbs or programmable ther-
mostats, the second category ‘medium investment’, compris-
ing medium-sized investments such as appliances or boilers,
and category ‘major investment’, comprising large investments
such as retrofits or solar panels.
house Categorical variable indicating whether the regression model
includes covariates that describe the building.
social Categorical variable indicating whether the regression model
includes covariates that describe the social status of a house-
hold or attitudinal variables.
politic Categorical variable indicating whether the regression model
includes covariates that describe the political orientation of
the household.
price Categorical variable indicating whether the regression model
includes covariates that describe energy prices or price levels.
temp Categorical variable indicating whether the regression model
includes heating degree days or other climatic variables.
14
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
year 167 2011 7.64 1983 2010 2016 2018
sampleZ 167 38,273.00 296,365.50 50 1,107.5 15,031.5 3,817,392
nCov 167 21.67 9.66 5 14 28 43
share 167 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.12 0.63 0.95
country = 1 167 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 1
country = 2 167 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 1
country = 3 167 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 1
country = 4 167 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 1
country = 5 167 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 1
country = 6 167 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 1
country = 7 167 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 1
country = 8 167 0.02 0.15 0 0 0 1
experiment = 1 167 0.18 0.39 0 0 0 1
investment = 1 167 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 1
investment = 2 167 0.61 0.49 0 0 1 1
house = 1 167 0.75 0.43 0 1 1 1
social = 1 167 0.62 0.49 0 0 1 1
politic = 1 167 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 1
price = 1 167 0.25 0.44 0 0 0.5 1
temp = 1 167 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 1
groups of moderator variables: moderator variables that describe the sample (year, share,
country, experiment, and investment) and moderator variables that serve as proxies for
the model specification (degrees of freedom, house, politic, price, and temp). Table 3
provides the summary statistics for the moderator variables. It reveals that our sample is
biased towards more recent data sets. Furthermore, the sample size of the studies varies
considerably, which reflects the broad type of publications included in our meta analysis
that range from small choice experiments to studies with data sets covering millions of
households over several countries.
The average study in our sample includes 22 covariates, with the largest model spec-
ification including as many as 43 covariates. This raises the question of the degree to
which the results from such analyses are hampered by multicollinearity. Although multi-
collinearity generally does not generate any bias in the estimates, it, nevertheless, creates
imprecise estimates, which are overly sensitive to changes in the model specification.8
8In order to test for the impact of the number of covariates on the size of the calculated standard
errors of our effect measures, we regressed the standard errors from all six effect measures on ‘nCov’
and ‘sampleZ’. However, none of the estimation models was statistically significant and, therefore, we
conclude that this problem is negligible in our sample.
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Finally, Table 3 shows that the distribution over the shares of adopters in each study
is right-skewed. This finding is not surprising given the fact that most studies in our
sample look at major investments, for which the uptake is generally low.
3.3. Results
Table 4: Unweighted mean effects, mean effects weighted with standard error, mean effects weighted
with sample size
Mean Std. Err. z p-value CI Lower CI Upper
Income unweighted 0.02962 0.02158 1.37233 0.16996 -0.01268 0.07192
Income weighted 0.01025 0.00784 1.30691 0.19124 -0.00512 0.02563
Income sample size 0.02946 0.00886 3.32539 0.00088 0.01210 0.04682
AgeMid unweighted -0.01086 0.05515 -0.19698 0.84385 -0.11895 0.09722
AgeMid weighted 0.00267 0.00900 0.29646 0.76688 -0.01498 0.02032
AgeMid sample size -0.00959 0.01184 -0.81008 0.41789 -0.03279 0.01361
AgeOld unweighted -0.00705 0.08149 -0.08655 0.93103 -0.16677 0.15266
AgeOld weighted 0.00424 0.01188 0.35725 0.72091 -0.01904 0.02753
AgeOld sample size -0.00668 0.01491 -0.44817 0.65403 -0.03591 0.02255
Edu unweighted 0.02351 0.03919 0.59983 0.54862 -0.05330 0.10031
Edu weighted 0.00294 0.00929 0.31645 0.75166 -0.01526 0.02114
Edu sample size 0.01794 0.00712 2.52024 0.01173 0.00399 0.03189
HZ unweighted 0.03319 0.05205 0.63759 0.52374 -0.06883 0.13521
HZ weighted 0.00273 0.00829 0.32948 0.74179 -0.01351 0.01897
HZ sample size 0.03027 0.01437 2.10646 0.03516 0.00211 0.05844
Own unweighted 0.03445 0.03631 0.94887 0.34269 -0.03671 0.10562
Own weighted 0.02356 0.01281 1.83863 0.06597 -0.00155 0.04867
Own sample size 0.03505 0.00862 4.06793 0.00005 0.01816 0.05193
Table 4 provides an overview of the mean effects of all six effect measures (Income,
AgeMid, AgeOld, Edu, HZ, and Own). We calculated the unweighted arithmetic mean,
θ¯ =
∑
i
θi
m
, where θi is the effect measure of the ith regression result and m is the
total number of results included. We also calculate the weighted mean, θ¯ =
∑
i wiθi∑
i wi
where—as it is standard—the weights wi are the inverse of the standard errors of the
effect measures. Using R package metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010), we calculate the weighted
means by means of a random effects model. Given that our effect measures stem from
studies that significantly differ in their model specifications, we cannot rule out that
our effect measures are in fact drawn from different populations (Becker and Wu, 2007).
Contrary to a simple weighted mean (the fixed effect model), which assumes that all
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effect measures are drawn from the same target population with one mean θ¯ and, hence,
assume that each effect measure can be described by θi = θ¯ + ǫi, the random effects
estimator assumes that effect measures are samples from different populations whose
respective population means are distributed around a grand mean θ¯. Hence, the random
effects model assumes that each effect measure can be described by θi = θ¯+φi+ǫi, where
φi depicts the difference between the grand mean θ¯ and the true mean of the population
from which the effect measure was sampled. The random effects model allows, therefore,
unconditional inference by assuming that the sample of studies is a random sample from
a larger population of all possible studies (Viechtbauer, 2010; Borenstein et al., 2010).
Following Houtven et al. (2017), we also calculate the mean effects using the study
sample sizes, sampleZ, of the respective estimates as weights. Whilst Houtven et al.
(2017) apply this approach because of non-reported standard errors of the effect measures,
our reason to apply it is different and is due to the non-linearity of the estimation models
used in most of our studies.
We use a binary probit regression model to exemplify the problem that arises from this
non-linearity. Figure 1 plots the Gaussian link function of the probit regression model.
The Gaussian link function, defining the probability of adoption P (Y = 1|X = x) =
Φ(X′β), is the cumulative density function of a standard normal distribution. However,
as the semi-elasticity, our effect measure, from a probit regression model is calculated as
∂P (Y = 1|X = x)
∂xk
· xk = φ(x
′β)xkβk, the size of the semi-elasticity will ceteris paribus
be influenced by the value of the probability density function φ(x′β), which in turn
is determined by the probability of an average household in the sample adopting the
energy efficiency measure. E.g., in a case where the probability of adoption for the
average household is 0.5, the derivative of the cumulated density function at this point
corresponds to the peak value of the probability density function. Hence, the value of
the probability density function that is used to calculate the semi-elasticity will be large,
whilst if the average household in the sample has a rather small or rather large likelihood
of adopting a measure, the corresponding value on the probability density function will
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Figure 1: Cumulative and probability density function of a normal distribution
18
be small and, hence, all things equal, the corresponding semi-elasticity and its standard
errors will be closer to zero.
One could argue that this characteristic of the semi-elasticities compromises the com-
parability of the effect measures across different samples and that all semi-elasticities
should instead be calculated at the mode of their respective probability density func-
tions. We argue that, as we are interested in the effect measure of the average household
from each study, this approach would no longer represent the true mean effect of our
sample, but would grossly overestimate the mean semi-elasticity.
However, in order to overcome the problem that smaller semi-elasticities ceteris
paribus correspond with smaller standard errors, we chose to include a more neutral
weighting factor, sample size, in our analysis. The effect of this choice becomes apparent
in table 4, where the mean effects weighted by sample size are considerably larger than
the mean effect weighted by the inverse standard error. In order to account for the influ-
ence of the adoption share on the corresponding semi-elasticities, we, therefore, included
the adoption shares as an additional moderator variable in our analyses.
Tables 5 to 10 report the results of the weighted least squares estimations for all six
effect measures, where we follow the standard approach of using the inverted standard
errors of the effect measures.9 We estimate four different model specifications: specifica-
tion one only includes sample-related moderator variables, the second specification only
includes model-related moderator variables, which in fact are of little interest for the
analyses and only serve as control variables, whilst the third and fourth specifications
estimate the full model.
Unlike meta-analyses based on experimental studies, which mainly test differences in
the mean effects between different treatment groups, our sample is based on regression
analyses with many different combinations of covariates. As discussed in the previous
9One could argue that as all six effect measures might be correlated, it would be appropriate to
estimate a system of equations. However, the equation set up does not imply an apparent correlation
of the error terms, which would necessitate such a step. Also, not taking an eventual correlation of the
error terms into account will, at most, result in less efficient estimates and, hence, to more conservative
results, but will not lead to biased results.
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Table 5: Moderator analyses for effect ‘Income’
Dependent variable: elaIncome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
year −.001∗∗∗ −.001∗∗ −.001∗∗
(.0003) (.0003) (.0005)
country = 1 −.004 .048∗ .038
(.017) (.025) (.029)
country = 2 −.015∗ .029 .033
(.009) (.028) (.028)
country = 3 −.003 .006 .013
(.014) (.021) (.023)
country = 4 −.009 .020 .014
(.010) (.019) (.021)
country = 5 −.013 .026 .034
(.012) (.031) (.030)
country = 6 .026∗∗ .060∗∗ .059∗∗
(.013) (.029) (.029)
country = 7 .003 .029 .031
(.011) (.019) (.019)
country = 8 −.014 .044 .052
(.010) (.040) (.039)
experiment −.010 −.031 −.031
(.014) (.020) (.022)
investment = 1 .008 −.002 −.003
(.012) (.013) (.014)
investment 2 .003 .004 −.0002
(.011) (.012) (.012)
share .107∗∗∗ .136∗∗∗ .157∗∗∗
(.035) (.047) (.044)
share2 −.101∗∗ −.123∗∗ −.137∗∗∗
(.040) (.049) (.051)
log(df) −.002 .002
(.003) (.005)
df −0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000)
house −.013 −.030∗ −.029∗
(.011) (.015) (.015)
social .006 .023 .028∗
(.007) (.016) (.016)
politic −.022 .059 −.004
(.023) (.037) (.029)
Price .010 .010 .003
(.007) (.013) (.012)
temp .004 −.009 −.017
(.010) (.016) (.015)
constant 2.008∗∗∗ .035 1.602∗∗ 2.217∗∗
(.571) (.028) (.672) (.898)
Observations 135 135 135 135
R2 .228 .045 .302 .284
Adjusted R2 .138 .0003 .180 .158
Residual Std. Error .368 (df = 120) .396 (df = 128) .359 (df = 114) .364 (df = 114)
F Statistic 2.531∗∗∗ (df = 14; 120) 1.008 (df = 6; 128) 2.466∗∗∗ (df = 20; 114) 2.256∗∗∗ (df = 20; 114)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6: Moderator analyses for effect ‘AgeMid’
Dependent variable: effAgeMid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
year .001 .001 .0004
(.001) (.001) (.001)
country = 1 .004 .019 .025
(.040) (.023) (.021)
country = 2 −.005 .072∗∗∗ .069∗∗∗
(.023) (.020) (.021)
country = 3 −.041∗∗∗ −.034 −.036
(.014) (.023) (.024)
country = 4 −.012 .035 .008
(.014) (.024) (.017)
country = 5 .002 .051∗∗∗ .048∗∗∗
(.019) (.017) (.018)
country = 6 .014 .069∗∗∗ .069∗∗∗
(.020) (.024) (.025)
country = 7 −.017 .005 .004
(.036) (.025) (.025)
country = 8 −.018 .116∗∗∗ .115∗∗∗
(.015) (.032) (.032)
experiment −.020 −.035 −.040∗
(.037) (.024) (.023)
investment = 1 .004 −.010 −.006
(.016) (.017) (.015)
investment 2 −.001 −.005 −.004
(.008) (.007) (.006)
share −.019 −.060 −.070∗
(.066) (.042) (.040)
share2 .054 .066 .083∗
(.065) (.054) (.050)
log(df) .0003 −.004
(.003) (.004)
df −0.00000∗∗
(0.00000)
house −.027∗∗∗ −.017 −.019
(.006) (.013) (.013)
social −.0001 .048∗∗∗ .049∗∗∗
(.007) (.017) (.017)
politic −.132∗∗∗ −.166∗∗∗ −.165∗∗∗
(.008) (.016) (.016)
Price .002 .014 .008
(.008) (.021) (.019)
temp −.006 −.074∗∗∗ −.076∗∗∗
(.007) (.021) (.021)
constant −2.120 .024 −2.189 −.720
(2.138) (.026) (1.830) (1.254)
Observations 96 96 96 96
R2 .139 .220 .447 .434
Adjusted R2 −.010 .167 .299 .283
Residual Std. Error .311 (df = 81) .282 (df = 89) .259 (df = 75) .262 (df = 75)
F Statistic .932 (df = 14; 81) 4.176∗∗∗ (df = 6; 89) 3.029∗∗∗ (df = 20; 75) 2.872∗∗∗ (df = 20; 75)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7: Moderator analyses for effect ‘AgeOld’
Dependent variable: effAgeOld
(1) (2) (3) (4)
year .002 .001 .001
(.002) (.002) (.001)
country = 1 .003 .017 .022
(.075) (.053) (.051)
country = 2 −.012 .136∗∗∗ .129∗∗∗
(.046) (.035) (.038)
country = 3 −.089∗∗∗ −.072 −.076
(.031) (.050) (.051)
country = 4 −.039∗ .030 .005
(.023) (.032) (.028)
country = 5 .006 .113∗∗∗ .107∗∗∗
(.041) (.032) (.033)
country = 6 −.031 .035 .026
(.047) (.070) (.075)
country = 7 −.042 .003 −.001
(.071) (.054) (.055)
country = 8 −.045 .198∗∗∗ .195∗∗∗
(.041) (.038) (.040)
experiment −.035 −.050 −.054
(.069) (.049) (.050)
investment = 1 −.005 −.039 −.035
(.027) (.027) (.025)
investment 2 −.005 −.006 −.005
(.012) (.011) (.010)
share .037 −.108 −.121
(.144) (.121) (.119)
share2 .043 .115 .132
(.140) (.124) (.123)
log(df) .001 −.006
(.006) (.008)
df −0.00000
(0.00000)
house −.061∗∗∗ −.043 −.045
(.015) (.029) (.028)
social .007 .097∗∗∗ .097∗∗∗
(.019) (.026) (.027)
politic −.223∗∗∗ −.278∗∗∗ −.277∗∗∗
(.019) (.040) (.039)
Price .010 .041 .037
(.013) (.031) (.030)
temp −.020 −.142∗∗∗ −.141∗∗∗
(.017) (.033) (.035)
constant −3.780 .047 −2.865 −1.439
(4.611) (.058) (3.123) (2.667)
Observations 96 96 96 96
R2 .155 .237 .449 .445
Adjusted R2 .009 .186 .303 .297
Residual Std. Error .427 (df = 81) .387 (df = 89) .358 (df = 75) .360 (df = 75)
F Statistic 1.064 (df = 14; 81) 4.608∗∗∗ (df = 6; 89) 3.061∗∗∗ (df = 20; 75) 3.010∗∗∗ (df = 20; 75)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: Moderator analyses for effect ‘Edu’
Dependent variable: effEdu
(1) (2) (3) (4)
year −.004∗ −.003∗∗∗ −.004∗∗∗
(.002) (.001) (.001)
country = 1 −.004 .009 .011
(.036) (.029) (.027)
country = 2 −.025 .009 −.002
(.037) (.034) (.031)
country = 3 −.009 .020 −.015
(.035) (.031) (.029)
country = 4 −.031 .053 .036
(.036) (.043) (.040)
country = 5 −.039 −.040 −.052∗
(.038) (.031) (.030)
country = 6 −.010 .027 .005
(.037) (.033) (.030)
country = 7 .041 .040 .019
(.050) (.030) (.030)
country = 8 −.004 −.033 −.026
(.035) (.031) (.028)
experiment −.010 .001 −.019
(.015) (.022) (.020)
investment = 1 −.032 −.029 −.034
(.021) (.022) (.025)
investment 2 −.023 −.025 −.031
(.018) (.020) (.023)
share .128∗∗∗ .069 .072
(.041) (.049) (.047)
share2 −.160∗∗∗ −.127∗∗ −.128∗∗
(.051) (.050) (.051)
log(df) −.007∗∗∗ −.015∗∗
(.002) (.007)
df −0.00000∗∗
(0.00000)
house −.018 −.061∗∗∗ −.054∗∗∗
(.017) (.019) (.019)
social −.013∗ −.034∗∗ −.025∗
(.007) (.014) (.014)
politic −.050∗∗∗ −.084∗∗ −.080∗∗
(.016) (.037) (.033)
Price −.012 −.030∗ −.028∗∗
(.011) (.016) (.014)
temp .019∗ .035∗∗ .039∗∗
(.010) (.017) (.020)
constant 7.984∗ .086∗∗∗ 7.034∗∗∗ 9.253∗∗∗
(4.721) (.027) (2.421) (2.323)
Observations 94 94 94 94
R2 .336 .124 .470 .480
Adjusted R2 .218 .064 .324 .338
Residual Std. Error .283 (df = 79) .310 (df = 87) .263 (df = 73) .260 (df = 73)
F Statistic 2.853∗∗∗ (df = 14; 79) 2.059∗ (df = 6; 87) 3.233∗∗∗ (df = 20; 73) 3.376∗∗∗ (df = 20; 73)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
23
Table 9: Moderator analyses for effect ‘HZ’
Dependent variable: elaHZ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
year .0001 .002 .002
(.001) (.002) (.002)
country = 1 −.054∗∗∗ −.043 −.042
(.007) (.032) (.035)
country = 2 −.0001 .079 .009
(.019) (.066) (.045)
country = 5 −.016 .026 −.014
(.013) (.039) (.027)
country = 6 −.022∗∗ .053 .009
(.010) (.055) (.046)
country = 7 −.020∗∗ −.040 −.040
(.010) (.074) (.065)
country = 8 −.032∗∗∗ .024 −.017
(.009) (.058) (.058)
experiment .035∗∗∗ −.041 −.037
(.011) (.063) (.057)
investment = 1 −.083∗∗ −.084∗∗∗ −.095∗∗∗
(.039) (.030) (.035)
investment = 2 −.080∗∗ −.068 −.079∗
(.038) (.045) (.045)
share .018 −.068 −.060
(.038) (.072) (.074)
share2 −.065 .024 −.012
(.062) (.077) (.088)
log(df)) −.009∗ −.022∗∗
(.005) (.009)
df −0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000)
house −.005 .014 .020
(.017) (.073) (.064)
social −.013 .019 .008
(.013) (.061) (.058)
price −.007 −.018 .010
(.011) (.043) (.033)
temp .003 −.060 −.018
(.008) (.067) (.068)
constant −.183 .103∗ −4.119 −4.419
(1.213) (.056) (3.668) (3.509)
Observations 61 61 61 61
R2 .213 .087 .301 .354
Adjusted R2 .016 .004 .024 .099
Residual Std. Error .373 (df = 48) .376 (df = 55) .372 (df = 43) .357 (df = 43)
F Statistic 1.081 (df = 12; 48) 1.054 (df = 5; 55) 1.087 (df = 17; 43) 1.387 (df = 17; 43)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 10: Moderator analyses for effect ‘Own’
Dependent variable: effOwn
(1) (2) (3) (4)
year .002∗∗ .004∗∗∗ .004∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.002)
country = 1 .033∗∗ .035 .032
(.015) (.049) (.045)
country = 2 .020 .030 −.065
(.033) (.060) (.082)
country = 3 .051∗∗ .103∗∗∗ .080∗
(.024) (.038) (.044)
country = 4 −.044 .042 .085∗
(.036) (.034) (.050)
country = 5 −.053 −.064 −.083
(.036) (.053) (.052)
country = 6 .048 .054 .015
(.054) (.087) (.088)
country = 7 .033 .002 −.042
(.028) (.051) (.053)
country = 8 −.060∗ −.123 −.156∗
(.033) (.086) (.085)
experiment −.078∗∗∗ −.065 −.063
(.029) (.050) (.049)
investment = 1 .019 .012 .009
(.015) (.016) (.015)
investment 2 .023 .025 .023
(.016) (.017) (.014)
share .181∗ .136∗ .183∗∗
(.097) (.080) (.092)
share2 −.189∗∗ −.170∗∗ −.217∗∗
(.091) (.086) (.092)
log(df) .003 −.031∗∗∗
(.007) (.010)
df −0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000)
house −.034∗ −.052∗ −.081∗∗
(.020) (.031) (.036)
social .023 −.038 −.070
(.015) (.044) (.046)
politic −.029 −.026 −.102∗
(.027) (.055) (.061)
Price .024∗ .019 .059
(.014) (.031) (.036)
temp .005 .053 .109∗∗
(.016) (.043) (.055)
constant −3.711∗∗ .004 −7.250∗∗∗ −7.431∗∗
(1.704) (.065) (2.334) (3.177)
Observations 70 70 70 70
R2 .467 .157 .681 .623
Adjusted R2 .331 .077 .551 .469
Residual Std. Error .320 (df = 55) .376 (df = 63) .262 (df = 49) .285 (df = 49)
F Statistic 3.442∗∗∗ (df = 14; 55) 1.961∗ (df = 6; 63) 5.225∗∗∗ (df = 20; 49) 4.052∗∗∗ (df = 20; 49)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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section, the average study contains around 22 different covariates, which means that we
cannot rule out correlations between pairs or multiple variables that might have an effect
on the effect size of our variables of interest (either by inflating the effect size through a
mediation or confounding effect or by supressing the effect size). If one assumes a critical
degree of correlation between at least one of the five household characteristics and an-
other covariate in the regression equation, effect measures from studies that include the
covariate will differ from effect measures from studies that do not, as in the latter case,
the omission of that covariate will create an omitted variable bias. The degree to which
this becomes a problem will depend on the correlation between the household character-
istic and this particular covariate and will most likely affect studies to different degrees,
depending on their respective household sample. Attempts to overcome this shortcom-
ing in meta-studies on regression coefficients have been conducted for linear regression
models with continuous dependent variables and covariates (see e.g., Becker and Wu,
2007, for an overview). However, to the best of our knowledge no approach has been
suggested to date to handle this problem for results from non-linear regression models,
models with binary outcome variables, and for model specifications with categorical co-
variates. Therefore, we follow the suggestions by Eagly and Wood (1994); Stanley and
Jarrell (1989); Stanley (2001) and Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006) and include further
moderator variables that address differences in the model specifications of the respective
studies. However, given the vast number of different variables that are included in the
studies, we have no realistic way of fully controlling the impact of each of these variables
on the coefficient estimates of our variables of interest. Therefore, we attempt to proxy
this influence by including dummy variables that indicate whether covariates of a specific
type were included in the regression model.
We run the standard residual tests for normality and heteroscedasticity, identify and
remove some outliers with high leverage, and use Ramsey’s RESET test to test all 18
model specifications. However, despite no apparent misspecifications of the regression
model and despite a considerable number of moderator variables in the full model spec-
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ification, even the model specification with the best fit can only explain around 30% of
the variance in our effect measures (only taking the adj. R2 values into account). On the
one hand, this low fit implies that other important factors may influence the variation of
our effect measures. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that our effect measures
are themselves rather noisy, which increases the overall noise of the regression models
and will further depress the (adjusted) R2 values.
Finally, following Houtven et al. (2017), we take the panel structure of our data into
account by calculating cluster robust standard errors using the sandwich package (Zeileis,
2004; Berger et al., 2017).
4. Discussion
Can household characteristics consistently explain the heterogeneity in households’
energy efficiency investments? Our results indicate that systematic patterns across the
five standard characteristics as determinants of households’ energy efficiency investments
exist, though to a varying degree across all five household characteristics:
• Our results show a positive correlation between income and a household’s propen-
sity to invest in energy efficiency for all three weighing strategies. The findings
listed in Table A.12 (see appendix) confirm this result. The majority of studies
find a positive correlation between income and propensity to invest. However, the
magnitude of the income effect on a household’s propensity to invest remains small.
A household with twice the income shows an increase in the propensity to invest
of between 0.7 and 2.1 percentage points.
• The effect of age is ambiguous and statistically insignificant for all three weighing
strategies. Elder households seem to have a slightly higher propensity to invest
than middle-aged households, but the difference is too small to be of economic
significance. The correlations listed in Table A.12 also show an ambiguous trend,
with a similar amount of studies finding a negative/positive correlation.
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• Education has a weakly positive effect on households’ propensity to invest in energy
efficiency. Household heads with at least some college education are between 0.3
and 2.4 percentage points more likely to invest in energy efficiency than households
who did not attend college. In addition, the majority of studies in Table A.12 find
a positive correlation between higher education and the propensity to invest.
• Household size has an overall positive effect on the propensity to invest. A doubling
of the members in a household increases the average household’s propensity to
invest by between 0.2 and 2.3 percentage points.
• Home ownership seems to have the strongest positive effect on a household’s propen-
sity to invest. A household who own their home are between 2.4 and 3.5 percentage
points more likely to invest in energy efficiency than a household who rent their
home. Studies included in Table A.12 largely confirm the positive effect of owner-
ship on households’ propensity to invest.
Interpreting the trends in effect sizes, we have to point out that the mean effects for
the most part are statistically insignificant from zero considering a 5% significance level.
Furthermore, only 6 studies included in the meta-analysis consider the effect of all five
household characteristics. Thus, the estimated mean effects for the different household
characteristics are based on different subsets of our sample. The magnitude of the effect
sizes for all five household characteristics should, therefore, be compared with caution,
having this limitation in mind.
Tables 5 to 10 report the results for our moderator analysis. Focusing on the sam-
ple specific moderator variables in specifications 3 and 4, we find statistically significant
differences in effect sizes for income, age, education and ownership across countries, in
comparison to studies based on observations from multiple OECD countries as baseline.
These findings may reflect country-specific differences that affect households’ energy effi-
ciency investments. The positive effect on the effect size for old-age in the USA, Germany
and Northern Europe may, e.g., reflect easier access to capital for investments for elder
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households compared to younger households in these countries/regions compared to the
average OECD country. Ireland and UK show a positive and significant effect on the
effect size for ownership. This finding may show that split incentives play a larger role
in Ireland and UK, so that homeowners have a larger incentive to invest in energy effi-
ciency than tenants. The opposite may be the case in Canada, which shows a significant
and negative effect on the effect size for ownership. However, at this stage, we can only
speculate on the cause of cross country differences.
The investment moderators controlling for investment intensity unexpectedly show
no statistically significant effects on the effect sizes for all household characteristics. We
take a closer look at the effect of investment intensity in Table 11 and in the following
paragraph. Altogether, as discussed in the previous section, the low (adjusted) R2 values
of the moderator analyses (specification 3 and 4) for income, age, education, household
size and home ownership, suggest that a major part of the variance in the study results
exists due to other unknown and, most likely, situational factors.
Table 11: Predicted effect measures for the three investment levels
Investment class
0 1 2
Income 0.0318 0.0302 0.0357
AgeMid 0.0056 -0.0046 0.0003
AgeOld 0.0083 -0.0311 0.0020
Edu 0.0513 0.0225 0.0264
HZ 0.0747 -0.0096 0.0062
Own 0.0321 0.0440 0.0571
Although the investment moderators for investment intensity show no statistically
significant effect on the effect measures, we find insightful trends for the predicted values
of our effect measures, given the three investment levels. We compare the predicted
values with our hypotheses from section 2. Table 11 shows how the predicted effect
measures for the five household characteristics change with the investment class from 0
= minor investment to 2 = major investment.
• A higher income shows a positive effect on a household’s propensity to invest across
all investment classes with the largest impact for major investment. Considering
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the difference in effect sizes between minor, medium, and major investments, this
difference confirms our hypothesis that the income effect, to some degree, strength-
ens as the capital intensity of the investment increases. The positive and reinforcing
effect of income confirms that financial resources and access to capital play a rele-
vant role in households’ investment decision.
• Age shows a mixed effect across investment classes for both age groups with small
effect sizes especially for major investments. Thus, age appears to have a limited
effect on households’ propensity to invest across investment classes. Drawing on
our investment model, we hypothesised an ambiguous effect of age, for major in-
vestments in particular, arguing with two opposing effects when age increases. Our
empirical findings for both age categories may confirm our hypothesis; however, we
cannot draw an unambiguous conclusion.
• The effect of having a higher education on a household’s propensity to invest is
largest for minor investments. Higher education increases the propensity to invest
in minor energy efficiency improvements by 5.13 percentage points. The effect size
is lower for medium and major investments. This result contradicts our hypothesis
that the effect of education increases, the longer the amortisation period of an
investment, i.e., the more capital-intensive an investment. Instead of being a pure
effect of educational attainment, the larger effect for minor investments compared
to medium and major investments may instead reflect the fact that households with
a higher education tend to have a more environmentally-friendly attitude, which
may correlate with a higher propensity for minor changes towards more energy
efficiency.
• The effect of household size is positive and much larger for minor investments com-
pared to medium and major investments. This finding confirms our hypothesis
that larger households with higher demand for energy services compared to smaller
households benefit over-proportionally from efficiency improvements through larger
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energy savings. The effect size is negative and/or smaller for medium and major
investments, which suggests that a lower per capita income for larger households
indeed decreases these households’ financial ability to make medium or major ef-
ficiency investments. However, given the low predictive quality of the regression
model, these results should be read with care.
• The predicted effect sizes for ownership show a clear and increasing trend across
investment classes. This finding confirms our hypothesis that households that own
their home are more likely to invest in energy efficiency than households that rent,
and that this effect increases with the capital intensity of the investment. Home
ownership appears to be the major determinant of households’ energy efficiency
investments. This result suggests that split incentives are a considerable barrier to
energy efficiency improvements in the residential sector.
Our results confirm that households that own their home, have a high income, and
fewer household members are most likely to invest in costly energy efficiency measures.
Thus, these households appear to face fewer barriers to investing in large energy efficiency
improvements than households that rent their home, have a low income, and a large
household size.
The positive effect of income on a household’s propensity to invest confirms that ac-
cess to capital and financial resources plays an essential role in a household’s efficiency
investment decision. Targeting access to capital measures or incentive payments on
households with low income that likely face liquidity constraints may increase the effec-
tiveness of these policies. Moreover, we find the effect of home ownership on a household’s
propensity to invest most pronounced. This result confirms that split incentives present a
considerable barrier to energy efficiency improvements. Households that rent their homes
are less likely to invest. However, considering the fact that tenants are often not allowed
to make investment decisions without the property owner’s permission, targeting tenants
with energy efficiency policies would probably not increase their investment propensity
and would, thus, have a negative effect on the policy outcome. Policies to overcome split
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incentives could instead target property owners, e.g., through efficiency standards for
rented properties.
5. Conclusion
Our empirical findings show–unsurprisingly–that income and ownership status reveal
the clearest trends in explaining households’ energy efficiency investments. This cor-
responds with our initial hypotheses, which we derived from the theoretical investment
model. Policy makers and modellers could potentially use these readily observable house-
hold characteristics to account for heterogeneity in policy design. However, two things
are worth noting. First, the magnitude of the trends we find is limited. Differences
between groups of households account for, at most, single digit percentage points, which
questions the economic significance of the results. Secondly, before designing targeted
policies, the additional costs should be balanced with the expected benefits. Given the
magnitude and insecurity, and especially the strong situational impact on the magnitude
and direction of the average effects we found in our meta-analysis, it is uncertain whether
any eventual benefits of more targeted policies would outweigh the additional costs of
implementation. It is, therefore, questionable whether targeted policy measures really
are a valid policy option beyond small and obvious areas of application. Indeed, simpler
policy measures, such as carbon taxes, may in many instances generate the same effect
at lower cost.
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AppendixA. Tables and figures
AppendixA.1. Further empirical evidence for heterogeneity in household energy efficiency
investment behaviour
Table A.12 summarises further empirical evidence of heterogeneity in households’
energy efficiency investments, which we could not include in our meta-analysis due to
methodological constraints or limitations on data availability.
Column (1) and (2) define the study under consideration and the country of origin of
the studied data. Column (3) describes the type of investment decision that each study
investigates. Activity level "0" represents minor investments, mainly considering invest-
ment behaviour with respect to energy-efficient light bulbs. Activity level "1" refers to
investments of a medium size, e.g., appliances. Activity level "2" corresponds to large
retrofit investments, which include envelope renovations, solar panels, and heating sys-
tems. Column (4) indicates the sample size of the analysis. Columns (5)-(9) show the
estimated coefficient of regression of a household’s decision to invest in energy efficiency
on the characteristics income, age, education, household size and home ownership, which
are identified by the studies under consideration. A positive (negative) coefficient, in-
dicating higher (lower) propensity to invest in energy efficiency, is represented by "+"
("−"). “∅” marks the case where a study does not address one or more of the respective
determinants. The values in parenthesis show the t-statistics for the estimates, where
bold font indicates statistical significance. Given the coefficients and standard errors, we
computed the t-values when a study did not directly report them. "NA" indicates that
t-values were unobtainable or unsuitable for the applied methodology. These cases also
include studies with categorical estimates (frequently used for the determinants income,
age and education), which implies two issues: First, non-linear effects, which we indicate
by "+/−" and second, different t-values for each category, which we report as "NA"
because finding a weighted average was not possible due to missing summary statistics.
A bold font "NA" again indicates statistical significance, as reported in the studies.
Studies that apply multiple models, i.e., consider different subgroups or dependent
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variables, appear in multiple rows. We provide further information on these and all other
studies in the Online Appendix.
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Table A.12: Further Evidence for Heterogeneity in Household Energy Efficiency Investment Behaviour
Study Country Activity level N Income Age Education Household size Home ownership
Achtnicht and Madlener (2014) Germany 2 379
+
(-61.69)
−
(-6.15)
−
(0.11)
∅ ∅
2 379
+
(-4.75)
−
(-2.05)
+
(1.86)
∅ ∅
Akhtar (2017) Pakistan 1 404
−
NA
−
NA
−
NA
∅ ∅
Barr et al. (2005) UK 0/1/2 1265
+
NA
+
NA
+
NA
−
NA
+
NA
Busic-Sontic et al. (2017) UK 2 1581
−
NA
−
NA
+
NA
∅ ∅
Busic-Sontic and Fuerst (2017) Germany 2 2948
−
NA
−
NA
+
NA
∅ ∅
2 2939
+
NA
−
NA
+
NA
∅ ∅
Charlier (2015) France 2 16 111
+
NA
+
(4.98)
∅ ∅
+
(10.20)
Charlier (2013) France 0/2 16 780
+/−
NA
+/−
NA
+/−
NA
∅
+
(2.23)
0/2 16 780
+/−
NA
+/−
NA
+
NA
∅
+
(1.56)
De Groote et al. (2016) Belgium 2 8471
+
(10.75)
+
NA
−
NA
+
NA
+
(3.85)
Dubin and Henson (1988) USA 2 688
+
(9.47)
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Ferguson (1993) Canada 2 450
+
(2.81)
+
(3.08)
∅ ∅ ∅
Friedman et al. (2018) Israel 2 451
+
(0.50)
−
(−1.68)
−
(−0.35)
+
(1.51)
−
(−1.30)
Goto et al. (2011) Japan 1 841
+
NA
+
NA
∅
−
NA
∅
Grösche et al. (2013) Germany 2 2128
+
(0.3)
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
2 2128
−
(-1.44)
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
2 2128
+
(0.89)
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
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Table A.12: Further Evidence for Heterogeneity in Household Energy Efficiency Investment Behaviour
Study Country Activity level N Income Age Education Household size Home ownership
2 2128
+
(0.17)
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Hartman and Doane (1986) USA 2 507
+
(5.35)
−
(-4.26)
∅ ∅
+
(4.00)
Hartman (1988) USA 2 658 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
+
(-3.10)
Houde (2014) USA 1 49279
+
NA
+
NA
+/−
NA
−
NA
∅
1 76115
+
NA
+
NA
+/−
NA
−
NA
∅
1 76115
+/−
NA
+/−
NA
+/−
NA
+
NA
∅
Islam (2014) Canada 2 298 ∅
−
(−0.64)
+/−
NA
∅ ∅
Karlin et al. (2014) USA 0/1/2 540
+
NA
+
NA
+
NA
∅
+
NA
Leelakulthanit (2014) Thailand 0 555
+
(1.76)
0
(0)
−
(−0.51)
∅ ∅
Long (1993) USA 2 5871
+
(8.02)
+
(2.49)
∅
−
(−1.42)
∅
Mendelsohn (1977) USA 2 5539
+
(4.32)
+/−
NA
∅ ∅ ∅
2 5539
+
(2.28)
+/−
NA
∅ ∅ ∅
Miller et al. (2014) USA 0/1/2 11115
+/−
NA
∅
+
NA
+
(0.75)
+
(19.81)
Mills and Schleich (2012) EU and Norway 1 4915 ∅ ∅
+
NA
∅ ∅
1 4915 ∅ ∅
+
NA
∅ ∅
Min et al. (2017) Korea 1 1000
+
(4.00)
+
(3.76)
+
(3.08)
∅ ∅
Nair et al. (2010) Sweden 0/1/2 1045
+
NA
−
NA
+
NA
∅ ∅
O’Doherty et al. (2008) Ireland 1 23526
+
(10)
+/−
NA
∅ ∅
+
NA
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Olsthoorn et al. (2017) EU 2 6265
+
(2.50)
+
(0.77)
−
(−0.13)
−
(−4.62)
∅
Powers et al. (1992) USA 2 690
+
(2.68)
−
(−0.67)
+
(2.48)
−
(−0.63)
∅
Reynolds et al. (2012) Saint Lucia 0 264
+/−
NA
+/−
NA
∅ ∅ ∅
0 264
+/−
NA
+/−
NA
∅ ∅ ∅
Rowlands et al. (2003) Canada 0 466
+
NA
−
NA
+
NA
∅ ∅
Sardianou and Genoudi (2013) Greece 2 150
+
(3.93)
+
(3.46)
+
(3.04)
∅
+
(0.84)
Scott (1997) Ireland 2 1200 ∅ ∅
+/−
NA
∅ ∅
2 1200 ∅ ∅
+
NA
∅ ∅
Shen (2012) China 1 3000
+
(1.79)
−
(−3.65)
+
(1.68)
∅ ∅
Smiley (1979) USA 2 1049
+
NA
−
NA
∅ ∅ ∅
Song (2008) Canada 2 5717
+
NA
+
(2.00)
−
(−3.00)
∅ ∅
Sopha et al. (2011) USA 2 960
−
NA
−
NA
−
NA
∅ ∅
Stolyarova (2016) France 2 17618
+
NA
+
NA
∅
+
NA
+
NA
2 17618
−
NA
−
NA
∅
+
NA
+
NA
2 14861
+/−
NA
+
NA
∅
+
NA
+/−
NA
2 1350
−
NA
0
NA
∅
+
NA
−
NA
2 1350
−
NA
−
NA
∅
+
NA
−
NA
Testa et al. (2016) Italy 0/1 198
+
(0.42)
−
(−0.90)
−
(−0.49)
∅ ∅
46
Table A.12: Further Evidence for Heterogeneity in Household Energy Efficiency Investment Behaviour
Study Country Activity level N Income Age Education Household size Home ownership
Ward et al. (2011) USA 1 355
−
(-0.18)
+
(-5.51)
−
(-0.37)
∅ ∅
Wilson (2008) Canada 2 295
+
NA
−
NA
∅ ∅ ∅
Yang and Zhao (2015) China 0/1 526
−
NA
+
NA
+
NA
∅ ∅
Yue et al. (2013) China 0/1 581
+
NA
−
NA
+
NA
∅ ∅
Zhou and Bukenya (2016) China 1 1569
+/−
NA
+
NA
+
NA
−
NA
∅
Legend: Activity level 0 = Minor investment, 1 = Medium investment/Appliances, 2 = Major investment/Retrofit.
"+" positive correlation, "−" negative correlation, "∅" not part of the study.
"NA" t-values unobtainable or unsuitable.
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